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PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Following the rule suggested by the United States bank-"
ruptcy cases in preference to the English rule on the subject,
Assignment the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Beals v.
by Maker, .Afayher, 54 N. E. 857, has decided, (I) that where
Partial Pay- the maker of a note has made an assignment for
ment by the benefit of creditors, and the indorser has made
Indorser a partial payment to the holder, the latter is enti-
tled to prove the full amount of the note before the assignee
of the maker, without deducting the amount received by him
from the indorser; from which it follows (2) that the indorser
cannot compete with the holder before the assignee for the
amount paid by him, since to allow him to do so would be to
allow a double proof of the same debt.
There is a presumption that the common law of the forum
is the law of a sister common law state, but there is no pre-
Law sumption that it prevails all over the world. By
Merchant, analogy the Supreme Court of Massachusetts rea-
Presumption sons that while the law merchant may be presumed
in other to be effective throughout Europe, there is no pre-
Countries sumption that it is effective in Asia. A charge of
court was therefore held proper, to the effect that there was no
presumption that the law of protest of negotiable paper was
recognized in Harpoot, Turkey, but that the burden was on
the party alleging the existence of any certain law there, to
prove it: Asaiazian v. Dostumian, 54 N. E. 845.
CARRIERS.
TIfi defendant railroad. company, operating in Iowa, leased
ap6idion of its right of way to an elevator company, the
Contract lease stipulating that the defendant should not be
Exempting liable for fire caused by locomotive sparks, even
Railroad from though the fi. was occasioned by the negligence
Liability for of defenda's servants. The elevator being burned
Negligence down, the Suprem& Court of the United States, on
an appeal from the Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit,
was called upon to decide whether the defendant could law-
32
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fully exempt itself from liability for the negligence of its ser-
vants: Ins. Co. v. Chicago, etc., Rzwy. Co., 20 Sup. Ct. 33.
The opinion of the court, by Justice Gray, clearly shows
that if this had been a case where the general commercial law
governed, i. e., a case where the railroad had attempted to
limit its liability for a duty which it owed the public, such as
the carriage of passengers and freight, the Supreme Court
would have declared the stipulation void, irrespective of the
decisions of the courts of Iowa. But the case did not involve a
question of this sort. The railroad was under no duty to make
the lease and there were no principles of public policy which for-
bade the insertion of such a provisi6n in a private agreement
between the railroad and the elevator company. Such being
the case, the court was bound to follow the Iowa decisions, as
on a mere matter of private property, and, it being clearly
shown that such an agreement was lawful in Iowa, the decision
of the Circuit Court of Appeals in favor of the railroad was
affirmed.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
The English Court of Appeal has decided an important case
in regard to the extent to which an irregularly obtained foreign
Foreign divorce will be recognized in England: Pemberton v.
Decreof Hughes, [1899] I Ch. 781. This was an action by
Divorce, Im- a wife to enforce her marriage right against herpeachmentforrreular alleged husband, to whom she had been married in
Ity In Service England. It appeared that she had been married
of Process previously in the United States and that her hus-
band was living, but she set up a decree of divorce obtained in
Florida, the validity of which was the question in the case. It
appeared that, by a rule of the Florida court, ten clear days
must elapse between the issue of the subpoena and the return
day, and the record of the divorce proceeding showed that
only nine days had elapsed. It was alleged that this defect in
the service of process prevented the jurisdiction of the Florida
court from attaching to the parties, and that there was no
objection to the collateral impeachment of the decree in the
English court, and this view was adopted by Kekewich, J.,
in the divisional court.
His decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal (Lindley,
M. R., and Vaughan Williams and Rigby, JJ.) and the princi-
ple laid down that for international purposes the test of the
jurisdiction of a court is not the regularity with which the
parties have been summoned before it, but the power which it
possesses to summon the parties and to decide the question pre-
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sented; that in this case the Florida court possessed undoubted
jurisdiction under the latter test; and that the fact that a rule
of procedure had been violated was not fatal to the jurisdic-
tion, but was a matter which should have been called to the
attention of the Florida court.
The opinion of Lindley, M. R., well repays a reading, but
the question arises,-how far does the !' power to summon
the parties and decide the subject-matter" confer jurisdiction ?
Suppose in the above case the defendant had never been
served. Would the undoubted power of the Florida court to
summon her confer jurisdiction? It is to be feared that a
general rule deducible from the above opinion might carry
the court a little further than it would wish to go.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Whether the Supreme Court of the United States possesses
the power to issue a mandamus to a state court to compel
obedience to a mandate of the Supreme Court, isSupremeCourt, an interesting question, and is touched upon, but
Mandamus not decided, in Ex. Parte Blake, 20 Sup. Ct 42.
to State It will be remembered that in the celebrated case
Courts of Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, the Supreme
Court of the United States declared unconstitutional a Tenn-
essee statute which gave priority to Tennessee creditors of
insolvent corporations, and decreed, "that as to the other
plaintiffs in error, .citizens of Ohio, the judgment must be
reversed, and the.cause remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion; and it is so ordered." One of
the aforesaid citizens of Ohio, not being satisfied with the
final disposition of the case by the Supreme Court of Tenn-
essee, applied to the Supreme Court of the United States for a
writ of mandamus to compel obedience to the above mandate.
The Supreme Court. of the United States, in an opinion by
Fuller, C. J., denied the; writ, on the ground that a writ of
error was'an adequate rediedy, but declined to pass upon the ab-
stract question of the power of the court to grant the mandamus.
Where counsel intend to appeal from the highest court of
a state to the Supieme Court of the United States, it is essen-
Sootial that. the constitutional question be presented
the Constitu- before the state..court. Thus in Scudder. v. Coler,
tional Ques- 20 Sup. Ct. £6, .an appeal was taken from the
tion Must be Court of Appeals of New York to the Supreme
Raised Court of the United States on the ground that a
New York tax was attempted to be levied upon property in
New Jersey. In the proceedings before the Court of Appeals
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no mention was made of any constitutional objection to the
validity of the tax as affected by the Constitution of the United
States, except one objection, which might either have referred
to the constitution of New York or that of the United States.
The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error, on the ground
that the record did not clearly show that the provision of the
Constitution of the United States had been called to the atten-
tion of the Court of Appeals.
In Comm. v. MurPAy, 54 N. E. 86o, the appellant had been
convicted, sentenced to imprisonment and had served a por-
tion of his sentence in prison, when the law under
Twijern which he had been sentenced was declared uncon-
Jeopardy,
Sentenced stitutional and his case was remanded for sentence
Under Con.- in accordance with a former law. The appellant
stitutlonal contended that, since his new sentence, together
Act with the time which he had served, would amount
to a greater term than his previous sentence, such sentence
placed him twice in jeopardy and punished him twice for the
same offence, but the Supreme Court of Massachusetts dis-
missed his appeal.
CONTRACTS.
Ever since the leading case of Mitchell v. Reynolds, I P. 'ims.
181 (1711), the English courts have never opposed technical
or unreasonable objections to contracts in restraint
Partial of trade, when such contracts are partial either as
Restraint
of Trade to time or place, reasonable in their nature, and
founded upon a good consideration. The latest
case in which such a contract was upheld is Haynes v. Dornan,
[1899] 2 Ch. 13. Defendant, on entering plaintiff's service,
covenanted not to enter the service of any other person or
firm within twenty-five miles from the plaintiff's works without
plaintiff's consent. The Court of Appeal considered that the
contract, while unlimited as to time, was limited as to space,
and was, upon the whole, reasonably necessary for the pro-
tection of the trade secrets of the employer. An injunction
was therefore granted to prevent its violation.
In a late case it was held that in an action for rent on
a written lease, the defendant may prove that at the time the
Illegality as lease was executed, it was the intention of defend-
Defenceto ant, and known to the plaintiff, that the premises
a Written were to be used for the illegal sale of liquors, and
ea that such sales took place with the knowledge of
plaintiff; which defence defeats recovery on the lease: Mound
v. Barker, 44 AtI. 346
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A rather interesting case, involving the latest mechanical
invention in music, has lately been decided by the Court of
"Sheet Appeal of England: Boosey v. Whzght, [1899] 
1
flusic Per- Ch. 836. Plaintiff possessed the copyright on sev-
forated Roll eral popular songs, including "the sole and exclu-
for flechani- sive liberty of printing or otherwise multiplying
cal Organ copies" thereof Defendant was a manufacturer of
one of the various well known instruments by which a
so-called " musical" effect is produced by the machine
itself, without any execution on the part of the performer
beyond that of regulating the time and tone of the instrument.
The question in the case was this: Was the sale of the per-
forated roll of paper employed in the instrument, with holes
corresponding to the various notes, and also containing marks
of expression, such as andante, noderato, etc., to guide the per-
former, a vio on of plaintiff's patent ?
It was first contended that a person could become acquainted
with the method of the perforation of the romls and could be-
come so expert that he would be enabled tollsadhe music
from the rolls, just as from an ordinary sheet of music. The
unlikelihood of any person going to this trouble prevented
the point from being sersonitred by the court.
It was then urged that the rolls were copies of a substantial
part of what was found in the sheet music, although expressed
in a different form of notation, being similar to the relation
which a piece of shorthand would bear to the ordinary letter-
press. The court, however, decided that the intention of the
act was to prohibit only such copies as would appeal to the
mind through the eye, and that the rolls were simply parts of
the machiyes and not " copies" any more than the cylinders
of music boxes would be. But while refusing to enjoin the
sale of the rolls, the court forbadhe efuse of the expression
marks to guide the performer, as coming within the copyright.
CORPORATIONS.
The Supreme Couit of the United States has again affirmed
the general rule that- a corporation cannot purchase and hold
Power to the stock of a rival corporation, except that it may
Purchase hold itb*- way of pledge for the security of an ante-
and Hold cedent debt: De La Vergne, etc., Co. v. Savings
Stock of a Inst., -20 Sup. Ct. 20. Nor does the New York
lroalton- Act of June 7, 853 (C. 333) authorizing such cor-
poratiofis"to "purchase mines, manufactories and
other property necessary for their business" confer any such
power. It is needless to say that the Supreme Court, after
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holding the purchase of the stock ultra vires, decided that the
mere fact that the contract was executed interposed no objec-
tion to the right of the defendant corporation to set up the
illegality of its own act as a defence to an action on the con-
tract ;-citing a long list of decisions beginning with Pearce v.
R. R., 21 How. 44i. Brewer and McKenna, JJ., dissented, but
the grounds of their dissent are not stated.
DEEDS.
Rooms on the second floor of a house, Nos. 13 and 14 Bond
street, were rented to plaintiff, together with the free right of
nisdescrip- ingress and egress "through the staircase and
tion, passage of No. 13." It appeared that there was no
Common staircase or passage to the demised premises in
M stake No. 13, but there was one in No. 14. The Court
of Appeal of England, affirming the decision of Romer, J.,
[1898] 2 Ch. 55I, held that, as there was evidently a common
mistake, the doctrine of falsa devnonstratio non nocet applied,
and the lease was rectified by allowing plaintiff a right of way
through No. 14: Cowen v. Truefitt, [1899] 2 Ch. 309.
EVIDENCE.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has affirmed the now
familiar rule that proof that a letter was mailed, properly
Recelptof addressed and stamped, raises a presumption that it
Letter, was duly received, but that this presumption is
Presumption rebutted as a matter of law, and should be so
declared by the court, when the addressee, whose testimony
is uncontradicted, swears that he never received the letter.
This rule was applied to the case of the mailing of a notice of
reinsurance to an insurance company, where it was held that
the rule of notice of dishonor of commercial paper did not
apply, but that the burden was on the insured to prove, or to
raise a presumption not rebutted by the insurance company,
that the notice was actually received: Packing- Co. v. Southern
Mut. Ins. Co., 44 Atl. 317.
A witness, who testified to a certain fact in direct examina-
tion, was asked on cross-examination whether he was not
Witness, present at a former trial where another witness
Correction testified to precisely the opposite, and he (the wit-
of Other ness) did not attempt to correct him. The question
Testimony was excluded. Held, no error: Turner's Appeal,
44 Atl. (Conn.) 310.
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On th trial of an indictment for selling beer on Sunday,
the defence was that the article sold was a non-alcoholic
U.S. Rev- liquor. A witness was'permitted to testify that he
enue saw United States revenue stamps on the kegs from
stamps which the alleged innocent liquor was drawn.
Held, no error, as tefiding to show that the kegs contained
malt liquor: State v. Wright, 44 Atl. (N. H.), 519.
In an action to try title to land, plaintiff offered in evidence
a piece of paper dated the year 1659, and produced from
Ancient proper custody, which paper purported to be an
Document, admission by a former tenant of one ot defendant's
Act of predecessors in title, that one of plaintiff's prede-
Ownership cessors had been persuaded to stop an action against
the writer for bringing his cattle on the land, on the payment
of sixteen shillings by the writer. Held, that the document
was admissible, not as an admission by the tenant as to title,
in which case it would be inadmissible against his landlord,
but as evidence of an act of ownership by the predecessor of
the plaintiff: Jenkins v. Earl of Dunraven, [1899] 2 Ch. 126.
"Society and the criminal are at war, and capture by sur-
prise, or ambush, or masked battery, is as permissible in
confession one case as in the other." Such is the language
Induced used by Justice Mitchell of the Supreme Court of
by Artifice Pennsylvania in holding that a confession was ad-
missible, even though induced by means of a trick, namely a
false assurance to the prisoner that a certain knife belonging
to him had been found; under the belief of which the prisoner
confessed the commission of the crime with which he had
been charged: Comm. v. Cressinger, 44 Atl. 433.
FRAUD UPON CREDITORS.
It is now well settled in Pennsylvania that where a man con-
veys his land to his wife by a recorded deed, such convey-
Oiftof Land ance is valid against a creditor whose debt is
to wife c'ontracted long after the conveyance, in the ab-
sence of fi~frmative proof that the conveyance was made
with intent to defraud the'creditor: Best v. Smith, 44 Atl.
329. In affirming this familiar rule Dean, J., deemed it im-
portant to call attention to certain-dicta of Black, C. J., in
Gamber v. Gamber, 18 Pa. 363, which unexplained, would
seem to indicate a contrary view.
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In Harrington v. Harrington, 44 Atl. 522, a suit for divorce,
it appeared that at the time of the libel both parties were resi-
Divorce, dents of New Hampshire, but that when the alleged
Offence Com- offence was committed the libellant was absent from
m-,edwhile the state, although the respondent was domiciledOther Party
is Absent in the state and the offence was committed. there.
from the After stating two propositions, (i) that the offence
State must be committed within the jurisdiction of the
court granting the divorce (Martin v. Martin, 47 N. H., 52),
and (2) that the libellant must be domiciled within the juris-
diction at the time, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
goes on to say that if both of these propositions were to be
enforced, the present libellant could not obtain a divorce
anywhere for that cause; therefore they made an exception to
the second proposition and granted the divorce.
Although a husband has the power to dispose of the remains
of his wife in any proper manner, yet this is not a property
B,,alof right and will not be permitted to be exercised
Wife, D - arbitrarily. Therefore, where the wife was buried
cretlon of in her parents' lot (according to her own previous
Husband request) and subsequently the parents bought a
lot in another ground, where they, with the knowledge of
the husband, prepared a tomb for her at great expense, the
husband was enjoined from interfering from the removal of
the body to the new ground: Toppin v. Moriarity, 44 Atl.
(N. J.) 469. The opinion of Steven, V. C., contains a discus-
sion of all the authorities on the subject.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts has decided that in
an action by a wife against another woman for the alienation
of the husband's affections, it is necessary for the
Alienation plaintiff to allege and prove actual loss of consortium,
of Affections,
Consortium and that alienation of affections alone is not a sub-
stantive cause of action, but merely an aggravation
of damages for the loss of consortium. Even in an action of
criminal conversation the loss of consortium must be alleged:
Neville v. Gile, 54 N. E. 841.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
It is well settled that in the absence of an express covenant
a landlord is under no liability to repair the premises and does
Defective not assume the risk of faulty construction. There-
Drains, fore the fact that the drains of the premises are so
Liabi.ity, unsuitably constructed and maintained that illness
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results in the tenant's family, by reason of the foul gas, does
not impose any liability upon the landlord: Towne v. Thomp-
son, 44 Atl. (N. H.) 493.
MORTGAGES.
The loose language of judges in many cases has led to con-
siderable confusion as to what benefits to the mortgagee may
Collateral be lawfully stipulated for in a mortgage. Thus in
Advantage Sanley v. White, [1899] 2 Ch. 474, the mortgagee
to Morgage of a leasehold stipulated not only for the repay-
ment of the amount advanced, but also for one-third of the
profits of the leasehold throughout the continuance of the
mortgage. The English Court of Appeal, reversing the deci-
sion of Byrne, J., [1899] I Ch. 747, held that the stipulation
for the payment of the profits was valid, and that the rather
vague rule, that the mortgagor's equity cannot be "clogged"
or "fettered," did not apply.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
The city of Chicago passed an ordinance granting to
licensed hackmen certain privileges in choosing the positions
Special Priv- in front of railrpad stations for their hacks. In a
liege to bill filed by -'railroad company against the city,
Licensed to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance, it was
Hackmen, hl i h a
Injunction eld (I) that the ordinance was unconstitutional
as granting exclusive privileges to certain persons
of the use of the city streets, which were held by the munici-
pality in trust for the general public and not for the use of
special persons, (2) but that an injunction would not issue,
since the railroad company had an adequate remedy at law
by which damages could be recovered for the injury to their
property: -Penna.'R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 54 N. E. (Ill.) 825.
NEGLIGENCE.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has added another
case to the long list of those which explain the meaning of
Defective Con- the rule that a railroad is respofisible to its employes
structlon of for injuries resulting from the negligent construc-
Railroad tion of the road. In Voorhees v. Lake Shore, etc.,
Track Rwy., 44 Atl. 335, it appeared that there was an
ordinary space of some seven feet between the various lines of
tracks on defendant's road, but that at one place a switch was
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only five and one-half feet distant from a track. The plaintiff,
a brakeman on a train coming down the latter track, jumped
off on the side toward the switch, in order to turn it, and in
doing so was struck by a car on the switch. The plaintiff
having testified that he had no knowledge of the especial nar-
rowness of the space between the tracks at that point, it was
held that the questions of the defendant's negligence in not
providing a sufficient space to work, and of the plaintiffs con-
tributory negligence in jumping down without looking at the
switch, were properly left to the jury, and judgment for the
plaintiff was affirmed.
The other side of the question presented in the preceding
case occurs in Gillin v. Patten & S. R. Co., 44 Atl. 361, where
Duty to the Supreme Court of Maine held (I) that there is
Block no common law duty imposed upon a railroad to
Switches block its frogs and switches to prevent the feet of
the workmen from being caught therein; (2) that a brakeman
who jumps down upon a switch, without stopping to see
whether or not it is blocked, is guilty of contributory negli-
gence, and (3) that the act of x889, c. z16, requiring railroads
to block their switches after January I, i89o, must be con-
strued so as to allow a road, constructed after i89o, a reason-
able time in which to perform its duty, and the statute does
not fasten negligence upon such a road which operates trains
before it is fully completed and before the switches are
blocked.
In Indiana the courts do not apply the "stop, look and
listen" rule with absolute strictness, but have adopted a more
Railroad flexible principle in regard to accidents at grade
Crossing, crossings, namely, that "when a person crossing a
Contributory railroad track is injured by collision with a train,
Negligence the fault is pimafacie his own, and he must show
affirmatively that his fault or negligence did not contribute to
the injury before he is entitled to recover for such injury." Of
course the extent to which the plaintiff must prove the absence
of contributory negligence is a mixed question of law and
fact, and varies with the peculiar circumstances of each case:
B. & 0. Rwy. Co. v. Young, 5 . N. E. (Ind.) 79 I .
PLEADING AND PRACTICE.
It was provided by the Pennsylvania act of March 17, 1869,
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that attachments under that act should "be made returnable on
Return Days the first return of said court next after the time of
of issuing thereof." By the act of 1878, as amended
Attachments by the act of 1879 (P. L. 125), it was provided that
In the attachments might be made returnable," on the
Pennsylvania first Monday of the next term, or on the second,
third or fourth Mondays of any intermediate month." Held,
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, that the latter act
repealed the above section of the act of 1869; therefore it is
not necessary to make the attachment returnable to the next
return day : Slinglff v. Sisler, 44 Atl. 423.
The defendant to a bill in equity may demur on the ground
that the cause of action is barred by laches, when said laches
statute of is apparent from the face of bill itself, but in an
limitations, action at law the defendant must plead the statute
Demurrer of limitations specially and may not raise it by
demurrer, even though the statement or declaration may show
that the cause of action is barred, chiefly on the ground that
it is necessary for the plaintiff to have an opportunity to reply
that the case is within one of the exceptions to the statute.
Such was the rule of the common law, and such is the law of
Illinois to-day: Gunton v. Hughes, 54 N. E. 895.
REAL PROPERTY.
In Bonebrake v. Surimers, 44 Aft. 330, the question was pre-
sented .'hether a charge upon land for the maintenance of a
Charge.. person for life was discharged by a sale of the land
Land, , by an assignee for the benefit of creditors under
Uncertainty. the Pennsylvania act of February 17, 1876.
Dscharge by The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided, (I)
Judicial Sale that the act of 1876 must receive a construction
similar to that of the act of April 6, 1830, in regard to judicial
sales, and. that those liehs, and those only, which would be
dischargedb~ya judicial sale, would be discharged by a sale
under the'act of I876; (2) that a charge for the maintenance
of a person, being of uncertain duration and incapable of being
valued exactly, would not be discharged by the judicial sale,
therefore'the lien in question was not discharged by the
assignee's sale.
f. The latest case where the rule in Shelley's case was rigor-
ously applied by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was
Rule In' Reiner v. Reimer, 44 Atl. 3 16, where a devise to
Shelley's Case A. for life with remainder over "if she leaves no
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heirs," was held to vest a fee in A. Considering that A. was
the daughter of the testator and that the remaindermen
included all her brothers and sisters, it seems pretty evident
that the word "heirs" was used to designate A.'s children,
but the Supreme Court refused to look at it in that light.
SALES.
Perhaps it is difficult in Pennsylvania to formulate any reli-
able rule which will make a clear distinction between condi-
Bailment with tional sales and bailments with options to purchase,
option to but there are a few essential elements of a valid
Purchase, bailment which attorneys will do well to remember.
Requirements In Morgan Electric Company v. Brown, 44 Atl. 459,
the agreement was in the usual form, the so-called "rent"
being secured by succession notes and the transaction being
carefully designated as a "lease," etc.; but one feature was
altogether lacking :--a provision for the return of the article
at the termination of the agreement. Chiefly on this ground
the transaction was held to constitute a conditional sale-cit-
ing Farquakar v. McAlevy, 142 Pa. 233-and the provision
contained in the agreement that, upon the payment of the last
of the notes, the bailor should make a bill of sale to the bailee
was considered to be a mere euphemism for saying that, upon
that contingency, the title of the vendee should become abso-
lute.
SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS.
It seems remarkable that some judges in Pennsylvania have
not yet mastered the distinction between the natures of the
Actions for actions for negligence which survive under the
Negligence eighteenth and nineteenth sections, respectively, of
Resulting In the act of April 15, 1851. Two long lines of cases
neatb, have conclusively established (i) that when the
Damages administrator of the deceased continues the action
under the eighteenth section, the measure of damages is pre-
cisely that which would govern the action by the deceased,
if alive, viz., damages for pain and suffering, necessary expenses
and loss of earning power during his probable period of life,
and (2) that where the action is brought under the nineteenth
section (by the person designated by the explanatory act of
April 26, 1855), the amount recoverable is limited to the pecun-
iary loss suffered by the plaintiff, (3) and that in no possible
instance may both classes of damages be recovered. Yet in
McCafferty v. Penna. R. Co., 44 Atl. (Pa.) 435, the trial judge
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instructed the jury that the mother of the deceased (who was
continuing, as administrator, an action commenced by the
deceased in his lifetime) could recover for her pecuniary loss.
As a matter of course, judgment for the plaintiff was reversed.
WILLS.
Testator by his will directed the residuary legatee to pay to
each of testator's three daughters $150 in case she married
Conditional within eight years, or $5oo if she remained un-
Limitation, married at the expiration of that time. Then
Time of followed the clause, "It is my will that if either of
Operation my daughters should decease, leaving no heirs, that
their legacy above named should be divided among such of
them as should survive." It having been agreed that the
word " heirs" should be construed as "children," the Supreme
Court of Vermont held that it was the evident intention of the
testator that the conditional limitation to the surviving
daughters was to take effect only upon the death of one of
them within the eight years, and that there was no foundation
for the contention that a life estate was created in the $5oo
with remainder over upon the holder dying childless: Andrews
v. Sargent, 44 Atl. 341.
